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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE LEGISLATION IN TAIWAN 
BEFORE AND DURING THE TSAI ADMINISTRATION 
 
Ernest Caldwell† 
 
Abstract:  The Republic of China on Taiwan (“Taiwan”) successfully and 
peacefully transitioned from authoritarian, one-party rule into a constitutional democracy 
in the early 1990s.  However, due to the island’s complex international status and fraught 
relationship with China, as well as a rather conservative government approach to post-
authoritarian discourse on past human rights violations, there has been relatively little 
scholarly interest in Anglophone academia on Taiwanese transitional justice issues.  This 
Article seeks to deepen our understanding of East Asian transitional justice by examining 
the influence of post-democratization local conditions on the scope and language of 
transitional justice legislation during two phases of Taiwan’s legislative history.  The first 
period runs from the initial steps towards democratization in 1987 until 2016.  During this 
time the Chinese Nationalist Party, which governed the former authoritarian regime, 
continued to dominate the Taiwanese government, and, in particular, retained its majority 
in the Legislative Yuan.  The second period runs from January 2016 to the present.  During 
this second period, the Democratic Progressive Party managed to secure both the 
presidency and a legislative majority. 
 
Cite as:  Ernest Caldwell, Transitional Justice Legislation in Taiwan Before and During 
the Tsai Administration, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 449 (2018). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article seeks to deepen our understanding of East Asian 
transitional justice by examining the influence of post-democratization local 
conditions on the scope and language of transitional justice legislation in 
Taiwan.  To date, scholarly studies in the field of transitional justice cover a 
wide range of geographical jurisdictions, historical periods, and theoretical 
debates, as well as various forms of conflict and modes of post-conflict 
resolution.1  The results of numerous case studies elaborating on European, 
Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African experiences have further served 
to refine and advance the field of transitional justice.  Until recently, however, 
few Anglophone publications have given much attention to contemporary 
                                            
† [BA, MA, LLM, PHD]; Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Laws of China and Taiwan, SOAS 
University of London. The author wishes to thank Chang Bi-yu, Chang Wen-chen, Leigh Jenco, Catherine 
Jenkins, Scott Newton, Lutz Oette, and the students from my 2017 “Law, Rights and Society in Taiwan” 
course for all their helpful comments and discussions. 
1 See, e.g., Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69 (2003); Thomas 
Obel Hansen, The Vertical and Horizontal Expansion of Transitional Justice: Explanations and Implications 
for a Contested Field, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE THEORIES 105 (Susanne Buckley-Zistel et al. eds., 2014). 
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transitional justice issues and practices in East Asian jurisdictions (e.g., China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan).2 
 
Individuals and groups within many of these countries experienced 
various levels of abuse during long periods of colonial and/or authoritarian 
rule.  As some of these countries transitioned into democracies, their 
governments and citizenry were often forced to confront the grievous human 
rights violations of the past.  The countries’ attempts to address these 
violations often drew upon lessons learned from transitional justice 
experiences of Europe, Africa, and Latin America, yet in the end their aims 
and practices were frequently tailored to localized contexts.3  As is often the 
case, the local social, political, and economic conditions of democratic 
transition either facilitated or constrained the availability of specific pathways 
to justice, as well as the very conceptualization of post-transition justice.4 
 
The Republic of China on Taiwan (“Taiwan”) successfully and 
peacefully transitioned from authoritarian one-party rule into a constitutional 
democracy in the early 1990s.  However, due to the island’s complex 
international status and fraught relationship with China, as well as a rather 
conservative government approach to post-authoritarian discourse on past 
human rights violations, there has been relatively little scholarly interest in 
Anglophone academia on Taiwanese transitional justice issues.5 
                                            
2 With the exception of studies on Japanese war crimes during World War II, there are few 
publications providing coverage of contemporary East Asian experiences with transitional justice. See, e.g., 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC (Renée Jeffery & Hun Joon Kim eds., 2014); INHERITED 
RESPONSIBILITY AND HISTORICAL RECONCILIATION IN EAST ASIA (Jun-Hyeok Kwak & Melissa Nobles eds., 
2013). 
3 See Leigh A. Payne & Kathryn Sikkink, Transitional Justice in the Asia-Pacific: Comparative and 
Theoretical Perspectives, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 2, at 33. 
4 For examples of the issues related to translating international norms and expectations into local 
contexts, see generally LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS 
VIOLENCE (Rosalind Shaw et al. eds., 2010); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL MECHANISMS AND LOCAL 
REALITIES AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (Alexander Laban Hinton ed., 2010); LIA KENT, THE 
DYNAMICS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL MODELS AND LOCAL REALITIES IN EAST TIMOR 
(2012). 
5 For notable exceptions, see Naiteh Wu, Transition without Justice, or Justice without History: 
Transitional Justice in Taiwan, 1 TAIWAN J. DEMOCRACY 77 (2005); Vincent Wei-cheng Wang & Samuel 
Chang-yung Ku, Transitional Justice and Prospect of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: Democracy and 
Justice in Newly Democratized Countries, GUOJIA FAZHAN YANJIU (國家發展研究) [J. NAT’L DEV. STUD.], 
July 2005, at 1; JUSTICE RESTORED?: BETWEEN REHABILITATION AND RECONCILIATION IN CHINA AND 
TAIWAN (Agnes Schick-Chen & Astrid Lipinsky eds., 2012). The recent increase in transitional justice 
discourse in Taiwan has resulted in new English-language research, for example Jau-Yuan Hwang, 
Transitional Justice in Postwar Taiwan, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY TAIWAN 169 
(Gunter Schubert ed., 2016); Ian Rowen & Jamie Rowen, Taiwan’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee: 
The Geopolitics of Transitional Justice in a Contested State, 11 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 92 (2017). 
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This dearth of analysis is unfortunate, because the study of Taiwan 
offers important insights into the impact of localized post-transition political 
dynamics on governmental responses to past human rights abuses.  In most 
post-transitional societies, for example, it is common for the former ruling 
party to dissolve or experience a significant loss of political power.6  Likewise, 
the primary actors of the party tend to experience some form of sanction for 
their actions, such as lustration, vetting, and often criminal prosecution.7  In 
Taiwan, however, the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, 
國民黨, “KMT”) directed the process of democratization beginning in 1987.  
It also maintained its control over the presidency from 1992 until 2000 as well 
as the democratically elected legislature from 1992 until 2016.  Furthermore, 
due to the significant reduction of state violence during the waning years of 
martial law and the tremendous economic growth of Taiwan under KMT 
stewardship, when the island transitioned to democracy there was an initial 
ambivalence within major portions of the population towards “punishing” the 
KMT through transitional justice mechanisms.8 
 
This Article examines the influence of post-democratization local 
conditions on the scope and language of transitional justice legislation during 
two phases of Taiwan’s legislative history.  The first period ran from the initial 
steps towards democratization in 1987, up until 2016.  During this time, the 
KMT continued to dominate the Taiwanese government, and retained its 
majority in the country’s unicameral legislature, known as the Legislative 
Yuan (Li fa yuan 立法院).  The second period ran from January 2016 to the 
present.  During this second period, the Democratic Progressive Party (Min 
jin dang,民進黨 , “DPP”) managed to secure both the presidency and a 
legislative majority. 
 
During the first era, the former authoritarian KMT retained a majority 
voice in the elected legislature and dictated Taiwan’s pathway to transitional 
justice.  The KMT was thus able to limit any legislation requiring 
accountability or the possibility of prosecution for past abuses occurring 
                                            
6 See, e.g., RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 160–69 (2000) (examining the purges of political 
parties in post-Soviet Europe). 
7 See Lavinia Stan, Lustration and Vetting, in AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 137 
(Olivera Simić ed., 2017); Rachel Kerr, International Criminal Justice, in AN INTRODUCTION TO 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 47 (Olivera Simić ed., 2017). 
8 See Wu, supra note 5, at 93 (“[T]he remote moment of repression combined with the fresh memory 
of satisfactory economic performance have largely decreased the demand for transitional justice.”). 
                        WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL               VOL. 27 NO. 2  
 
452
during the forty years in which the party held absolute power.  Unable to fully 
ignore calls for confronting past abuses, the KMT-dominated legislature 
passed three pieces of transitional-justice legislation during this period that 
provided limited reparations and restoration of honor to a narrow category of 
victims. 
 
During the second period, the DPP succeeded in winning not only the 
presidency, but more importantly, it won an elected majority in the legislature 
for the first time in Taiwan’s history.  Victory in the legislature allowed the 
current DPP government to actively pursue transitional justice legislation with 
minimal concern over interference from the KMT.  Furthermore, the election 
leading up to 2016 reinvigorated transitional justice discourse in Taiwan.  
Since the rise of the DPP, there have been numerous legislative bills related 
to transitional justice submitted by various groups, including the KMT.9 
 
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the historical events 
giving rise to the need for transitional justice in Taiwan.  Part III examines the 
language and scope of transitional justice legislation passed by the KMT-
dominated legislature against the backdrop of the process of democratization.  
Part IV examines the reinvigoration of transitional justice discourse during the 
presidential and legislative campaigning for the 2016 elections, as well as its 
influence on the scope and language of legislative bill proposals made by the 
DPP after the party’s electoral victories.  Part V concludes by considering the 
future of transitional justice legislation in Taiwan. 
 
II. TAIWANESE SOURCES OF INJUSTICE 
 
Scholars typically categorize Taiwan’s sources of historical injustice 
within three distinct periods.10  The first period began in 1895 when, shortly 
after suffering a humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, the imperial 
government of Qing China (清, 1644–1911) was forced to sign the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki (下関条約, April 17, 1895) with Japan.  As one of the conditions 
of the treaty, the Chinese government ceded control over the island of Taiwan 
                                            
9 Proposed Bill, Kuomintang dangtuan (國民黨黨團) [KMT Caucus], Zhuanxing zhengyi ji cujin 
renmin tuanjie yu hejie tiaoli caoan (轉型正義及促進人民團結與和解條例草案) [Transitional Justice and 
the Promotion of Societal Unification and Reconciliation Bill] (2017), 
http://lci.ly.gov.tw/LyLCEW/agenda1/02/pdf/09/03/10/LCEWA01_090310_01505.pdf. 
10 Hwang, supra note 5, at 169–70. 
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to the Japanese Empire.11  Taiwan would not return to Chinese rule until the 
end of World War II in 1945. 
 
Under fifty years of Japanese colonial rule, the local Taiwanese 
population benefited greatly from improvements to agriculture, medicine, and 
sanitation, increased education and literacy levels (in Japanese), and 
heretofore unknown levels of bureaucratic efficiency and legal 
modernization.12  But during this time, the local population also suffered from 
a variety of political, civil, and economic abuses, such as a lack of 
representation in the Japanese Diet, media censorship, restrictive government 
monopolies, and land expropriation.13 
 
The colonial period of Taiwan has been well documented in the fields 
of history and literary studies.  However, transitional and historical justice 
theories and mechanisms are rarely applied to the study of the island’s history 
prior to its retrocession to the Republic of China in 1945. 14   This 
governmental—and even scholarly—“disinterest” in the Japanese colonial 
period is particularly problematic when confronting the treatment of Taiwan’s 
aboriginal population and the Japanese expropriation of aboriginal lands.15  As 
a result, many of the century-old transitional and historical justice issues of 
Taiwan’s indigenous communities remain unresolved.16 
                                            
11 Treaty of Shimonoseki, Apr. 17, 1895, arts. 3, 4, Japan-China, 181 CONSOL. T.S. 217. 
12 See, e.g., TAY-SHENG WANG, LEGAL REFORM IN TAIWAN UNDER JAPANESE COLONIAL RULE, 1895–
1945: THE RECEPTION OF WESTERN LAW (2000); Harry J. Lamley, Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: 
The Vicissitudes of Colonialism, in TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY 201 (Murray A. Rubinstein ed., 2007). 
13 See generally HUI-YU CAROLINE TS’AI, TAIWAN IN JAPAN’S EMPIRE-BUILDING: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
APPROACH TO COLONIAL ENGINEERING (2009). 
14 The main Anglophone studies of human rights and transitional justice all explicitly leave out 
consideration of Taiwan’s colonial period. See Wu, supra note 5, at 84–85; Daniel Bowman, Righting the 
Wrongs of the Past?: The Human Rights Policies of Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, in TAIWAN SINCE 
MARTIAL LAW: SOCIETY, CULTURE, POLITICS, ECONOMY 485 (David Blundell ed., 2012); Hwang, supra note 
5, at 169 . 
15 See, e.g., Scott Simon, Making Natives: Japan and the Creation of Indigenous Formosa, in 
JAPANESE TAIWAN: COLONIAL RULE AND ITS CONTESTED LEGACY 75 (Andrew D. Morris ed., 2015); Lee 
Ming-cheng (李明政), Yuan zhu min she hui sheng huo fa zhan yu zhuan xing zheng yi (原住民社會生活發
展與轉型正義) [Transitional Justice and the Development of Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples’ Social Life], 
6 TAIWAN YUAN ZHU MIN ZU YAN JIU XUE BAO (台灣原住民族學報) [J. TAIWAN INDIGENOUS STUD. ASS’N] 
97 (2016). 
16 See generally JOLAN HSIEH, COLLECTIVE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: IDENTITY-BASED 
MOVEMENT OF PLAIN INDIGENOUS IN TAIWAN (2006); Hsieh Jolan & Wu Ming-chi (謝若蘭 & 吳明季), 
Zhuan xing zheng yi de si kao yu shi jian (轉型正義的思考與實踐) [Perspectives on Taiwanese Indigenous 
Peoples’ Transitional Justice], 6 TAIWAN YUAN ZHU MIN ZU YAN JIU XUE BAO (台灣原住民族學報) [J. 
TAIWAN INDIGENOUS STUD. ASS’N] 1 (2016). 
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Most studies of transitional justice in Taiwan begin with the second 
historical period, covering the return of the island to Chinese control at the 
end of World War II.17  More specifically, transitional justice discourse in 
post-democratization Taiwan focuses rather myopically on the policies and 
actions of the KMT during the authoritarian period.  This is at the expense of 
a more comprehensive approach to historical justice that would seek to 
address wrongs spanning two types of regimes—and for which there were 
numerous, often overlapping victims. 
 
Given the length of the Japanese colonial period and the many positive 
contributions the Japanese administration made to Taiwanese society, 
Taiwan’s return to a KMT-led government by the Republic of China created 
a great deal of uncertainty and a crisis of identity among Taiwan’s 
population. 18   Similarly, there was uncertainty and mistrust among the 
mainland Chinese citizenry who had just endured several brutal years of war 
with Japan.19  Furthermore, the draining of Taiwan’s resources back to the 
mainland to assist the KMT’s war against the communist forces of Mao 
Zedong (毛澤東), the existence of unfair government monopolies, and the 
poor local administration led to mounting tensions between the local 
Taiwanese population and the newly arrived mainland population of soldiers, 
policemen, and bureaucrats.20 
 
Tensions reached a climax on February 27, 1947, when a Taiwanese 
woman illegally selling cigarettes suffered abuse at the hands of the 
government’s Tobacco Monopoly inspectors.21  Taiwanese citizens present at 
the incident threatened the inspectors, one of whom shot and killed a citizen.22  
The following day, the local Taiwanese population stormed the police 
headquarters and riots and protests broke out island-wide.23  The national 
                                            
17 See, e.g., Hwang, supra note 5, at 169; Agnes Schick-Chen, Coming to Terms with the Past on Both 
Sides of the Taiwan Strait: Historical and Political Context, in JUSTICE RESTORED?: BETWEEN 
REHABILITATION AND RECONCILIATION IN CHINA AND TAIWAN, supra note 5, at 9; SYLVIA LI-CHUN LIN, 
REPRESENTING ATROCITY IN TAIWAN: THE 2/28 INCIDENT AND WHITE TERROR IN FICTION AND FILM (2007). 
18 STEVEN E. PHILLIPS, BETWEEN ASSIMILATION AND INDEPENDENCE: THE TAIWANESE ENCOUNTER 
NATIONALIST CHINA, 1945–1950 41–44 (2003). 
19 Id. 
20 LAI TSE-HAN ET AL., A TRAGIC BEGINNING: THE TAIWAN UPRISING OF FEBRUARY 28, 1947 73–99 
(1991). 
21 Id. at 102–03. 
22  Id. at 103. 
23  Id. at 105–06.  
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government responded by dispatching soldiers from the mainland to quell the 
populace.24 
 
Over the next few months, the mainland soldiers and police forces 
assaulted, imprisoned, and killed thousands of Taiwanese. 25   The exact 
numbers of Taiwanese killed during the months following the initial event 
remains unknown.  According to the report by the Taiwan Provincial Garrison 
Command issued shortly after the event, 398 people were killed, 72 were still 
missing, and 2131 were injured; however, subsequent reports give figures 
ranging from 5000 to 28,000 deaths.26  The 228 Incident (二二八事件), as it 
is now known, lasted for only a few months, but the scale of abuses suffered 
by the Taiwanese people remains a painful source of social division between 
the mainlanders (those ethnic Chinese arriving from the Chinese mainland 
after 1945) and Taiwanese even today.27 
 
By 1948, the KMT was losing the civil war on the mainland to the 
communist forces of Mao Zedong.  President Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), 
along with the Republic of China legislature, promulgated the Temporary 
Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion (“Temporary 
Provisions”), 28  which instituted a state of emergency, gave the president 
extraordinary powers, and suspended the vast majority of civil and political 
rights enshrined within the 1947 Constitution of the Republic of China (“ROC 
Constitution”).  Soon after, however, the KMT government fled the mainland, 
establishing a “government in exile” on Taiwan with the intent of reclaiming 
the mainland in the future. 
 
Over the next forty years, martial law and Temporary Provisions were 
renewed indefinitely, thus providing legitimacy and legality to the KMT’s 
authoritarian rule over the island.  This became popularly known as the White 
Terror period (bai se kong bu, 白色恐怖, 1949–1987) and represents the third 
                                            
24  Id. at 104–09.  
25 Id. at 141–67. 
26 By 2005, the 228 Memorial Foundation issued compensations for 681 deaths, 177 disappearances, 
and 1294 imprisonments. See Wu, supra note 5, at 90. 
27 Chris Fuchs, 30 Years After End of Martial Law, Scars from Taiwan’s ‘White Terror’ Remain, NBC 
NEWS (Feb. 27, 2017, 5:53 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/40-years-after-end-martial-
law-scars-taiwan-s-white-n725251. 
28 Dongyuan Kanluan Shiqi Linshi Tiaokuan (動員戡亂時期臨時條款) [Temporary Provisions 
Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion], FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (1948) (repealed 1991), 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0000005. 
                        WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL               VOL. 27 NO. 2  
 
456
historical era in which state-sanctioned human rights abuses were inflicted 
upon the population of Taiwan.29  However, unlike the 228 Incident, the 
victims during this period were not limited to Taiwanese and indigenous 
peoples, but included thousands of mainlanders suspected of spying or being 
communist sympathizers.  Under the auspice of martial law, numerous minor 
criminal offenses were re-categorized as “political” offenses.30  This allowed 
the KMT to actively and legally employ courts-martial to try outspoken 
civilians critical of the KMT’s rule and limit their options for appeal.  Martial 
law further allowed the KMT government to amass great wealth through 
expropriation of private lands and the development of government 
monopolies at the expense of local businesses.31  Although no official report 
on the White Terror period has ever been commissioned, scholarly estimates 
from surveys of extant and declassified case records indicate that 140,000 
civilians were tried in courts-martial between 1949 and 1987, resulting in tens 
of thousands of imprisonments, thousands of cases of property confiscation, 
and roughly 3000 to 4000 executions.32 
 
The national government in Taiwan, particularly in the initial two 
decades of democratic rule, took a very conservative stance towards creation 
and application of transitional justice mechanisms via the formal legislative 
process despite the numerous human rights abuses evident from Taiwan’s past.  
This is partially a result of the KMT’s continued dominance in Taiwan’s 
newly minted democratic political landscape.  Despite the three transfers of 
executive power between the KMT and DPP since democratization was 
initiated, there still exists an underlying public dissatisfaction with the formal 
legislative responses of the national government. 
 
The remainder of this Article compares the scope and language of 
transitional justice legislation passed by the KMT-dominated legislature from 
1987 to 2016 to the legislative bills introduced by the DPP in the early months 
of the DPP-dominated legislature beginning in 2016. 
 
                                            
29 See generally SU RUI-CHIANG (蘇瑞鏘 ), BAISE KONGBU ZAI TAIWAN: ZHANHOU TAIWAN 
ZHENGZHI ANJIAN ZHI CHUZHI (白色恐怖在台灣:戰後台灣政治案件之處置) [WHITE TERROR IN TAIWAN: 
POSTWAR POLITICAL PLACEMENT IN TAIWAN] (2014). 
30 See Ming-min Peng, Political Offences in Taiwan: Laws and Problems, 47 CHINA Q. 471, 476 
(1971). 
31 Joseph Bosco, Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage, and the State in Local Politics, in THE OTHER 
TAIWAN: 1945 TO THE PRESENT 114, 131–33 (Murray A. Rubinstein ed., 1994). 
32 Hwang, supra note 5, at 170. 
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III. THE FIRST WAVE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE UNDER THE KMT-
DOMINATED LEGISLATURE 
 
A. Democratization and KMT Attempts to Rectify (and Dodge) Its 
Past Wrongs 
 
Despite Taiwan’s economic success and improved standard of living in 
the 1980s, the KMT government found that after nearly forty years of one-
party rule, its domestic support had begun to wane and intraparty factionalism 
increasingly threatened party unity.33  The legitimacy and political dominance 
of the authoritarian KMT were further eroded by the results of limited 
elections at the national and local levels, which showed increased political 
gains by members of the fledgling “opposition,” known collectively as 
dangwai (黨外 , literally meaning “outside a political party”). 34   More 
importantly, the KMT’s international support became evermore tenuous.  
Countries like the United States, which formally recognized the People’s 
Republic of China but continued to both politically and economically support 
the de facto existence of the “free” Republic of China government in Taiwan, 
found it increasingly difficult to justify continued support of a one-party 
authoritarian government masquerading as a democracy.35  
 
For these and other reasons, President Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), the 
son of Chiang Kai-shek, established a basic plan for lifting martial law and 
transforming Taiwan into a constitutional democracy.  He died in 1988, 
however, and the task of refining and implementing these plans while 
simultaneously protecting the assets and ensuring the continued existence of 
the KMT throughout the process of democratization fell to then-Vice 
President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝). 
 
As Taiwan’s first native-born president, Lee was often able to mediate 
concerns of the KMT and the local Taiwanese population during the 
                                            
33 LINDA CHAO & RAMON H. MYERS, THE FIRST CHINESE DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL LIFE IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN 120–27 (1998). 
34 STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER 
THE COLD WAR 309–18 (2010);.See also Linda Chao & Ramon H. Myers, How Elections Promoted 
Democracy in Taiwan Under Martial Law, 162 CHINA Q. 387, 391 (2000); HUNG-MAO TIEN, THE GREAT 
TRANSITION: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 97–103 (1989). 
35 JOHN F. COPPER, TAIWAN: NATION-STATE OR PROVINCE? 369–72 (6th ed. 2013). 
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transitional process.36  Under his leadership, martial law was formally lifted 
in 1987, and the infamous Temporary Provisions were abolished in 1991.37  
The removal of these restrictive laws and policies opened the door for greater 
public participation, allowed for the formation of new political parties, and 
loosened restrictions on the media.  Furthermore, an interpretation of the 
continued constitutionality of the Temporary Provisions by the Constitutional 
Court required all officials originally elected in 1947 and 1948 on the 
mainland to retire,38 and a subsequent series of constitutional amendments 
paved the way for the first round of full elections to be held since 1948.39 
 
Through these political and constitutional changes, Taiwan’s 
government peacefully transitioned from a one-party authoritarian state to a 
constitutional democracy.40  Yet the specter of the past was never far behind, 
and the KMT faced the necessity of winning free elections via an electorate 
that it had oppressed for nearly forty years. 
 
B. Party Protectionism and the National Security Act of 1987 
 
As democratization and free elections loomed on the horizon, the KMT 
increasingly considered the political, as well as legal, implications of the 
human rights abuses perpetrated by its government during the previous forty 
years.  Prior to lifting martial law in 1987, the government carried out two 
attempts to insulate the KMT from the potential negative effects of its 
authoritarian past.  First, the KMT issued an amnesty to 237 political prisoners, 
and second, the KMT introduced legislation that severely limited the ability 
of civilians to appeal convictions originating in the courts-martial. 
 
                                            
36 Ya-li Lu, Lee Tung-hui’s Role in Taiwan’s Democratization: A Preliminary Assessment, in 
ASSESSING THE LEE TUNG-HUI LEGACY IN TAIWAN’S POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND 
EXTERNAL RELATIONS 53, 55–61 (Bruce J. Dickson & Chien-min Chao eds., 2002). 
37 The process of lifting martial law began with Chiang Ching-kuo, but was implemented by Lee.  See 
id. at 55. 
38 Judicial Yuan [J.Y.] Interpretation No. 261, DAFAGUAN JIESHI [JIESHI] (Const. Ct. June 21, 1990), 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=261. 
39 HSIEH CHENG-TAO (謝正道), ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIUXIAN SHI (中華民國修憲史) [HISTORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 213–20 (2d ed. 2005). 
40 Although the process was relatively peaceful, it was not necessarily smooth. Protests, charges of 
continued corruption, etc. haunted Taiwan’s democratic transition. Some even argue that due to the continued 
political dominance of the KMT after the transition, Taiwan has yet to fully transition. See, e.g., Peter R. 
Moody, Jr., Some Problems in Taiwan’s Democratic Consolidation, in ASSESSING THE LEE TUNG-HUI 
LEGACY IN TAIWAN’S POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 36, 
at 27; Kharis Templeman et al., Taiwan’s Democracy Under Chen Shui-bian, in TAIWAN’S DEMOCRACY 
CHALLENGED: THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN YEARS 1 (Yun-han Chu et al. eds., 2016). 
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The first action occurred on July 14, 1987, when the Ministry of 
Defense announced a partial amnesty (reduction of sentences and/or 
restoration of rights) for 237 political prisoners in response to the negative 
public opinion resulting from the KMT’s use of military courts to sentence 
political opponents to lengthy prison sentences, life imprisonment, or death.41  
Critics of this amnesty, however, quickly pointed out its limitations. Under 
existing laws, individuals convicted of sedition or other political offenses 
were barred from holding public office and from many other professions such 
as civil servants, lawyers, and medical doctors.42  Thus, although they could 
now vote in elections, many of the former authoritarian regime’s most ardent 
opponents were excluded for life from holding government posts as a result 
of their previous convictions. 
 
The 237 individuals covered under the “token” partial amnesty 
represent only a few of the tens of thousands of civilians tried for political 
reasons in military courts and subsequently imprisoned or executed during the 
White Terror period.  For those remaining victims, the all-important Article 
10 of the Martial Law Act would go into effect once martial law was lifted.43  
Under the ROC Constitution, only active-duty military personnel may be tried 
in a military court; 44 however, Articles 8 and 9 of the Martial Law Act provide 
a list of offenses for which civilians may be tried by courts-martial during 
times of emergency.45  Article 10 of this same act was originally designed as 
a legal safeguard for the restoration of individual rights once the government 
suspended the state of emergency.  Specifically, Article 10 provided that 
civilians sentenced for crimes or currently undergoing investigation or trial 
via military courts were entitled to request a retrial or reconsideration by 
civilian courts once martial law was lifted.46 
 
The second action the KMT took arose from its fear of the potential 
volume of citizen accusations and appeals.  Thus, on the eve of the repeal of 
martial law, the KMT-dominated legislature passed the 1987 National 
                                            
41 Taiwan Ends Martial Law After 38 Years but...No Dancing in the Streets, TAIWAN COMMUNIQUÉ 
(Int’l Comm. for Human Rights in Taiwan, The Hague, Neth.), Sept. 1987, at 6. 
42 Id.  
43 Jieyan Fa (戒嚴法) [Martial Law Act], art. 10, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (1934) (amended 1948), 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=F0070002 [hereinafter Martial Law Act]. 
44 MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (1947) (Taiwan). 
45 Martial Law Act arts. 8, 9. 
46 Id. art. 10 (“Upon the day following the repeal of martial law, all sentences made under Article 8 
and Article 9 [of this law], may be appealed in accordance with the law” (第八條第九條之判決，均得依
解嚴之翌日起，依法上訴)). 
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Security Act (國家安全法).47  This act provided, inter alia, an article designed 
to limit appeals by civilians sentenced in courts-martial during the 
authoritarian period.  Due to its importance, I have translated the entirety of 
Article 9 below. 
 
Original English Translation 
第九條: 
 
戒嚴時期戒嚴地域內，經軍
事審判機關審判之非現役軍人刑事
案件，於解嚴後依左列規定處理： 
 
一、 軍事審判程序尚未終結
者，偵查中案件移送該管檢察官偵
查，審判中案件移送該管法院審
判。 
 
 
二、 刑事裁判已確定者，不
得向該管法院上訴或抗告。但有再
審或非常上訴之原因者，得依法聲
請再審或非常上訴。 
 
 
 
三、 刑事裁判尚未執行或在
執行中者，移送該管檢察官指揮執
行。 
Article 9: 
 
 
Once martial law is repealed, 
criminal cases of civilians tried by courts-
martial during the period of martial law 
shall be handled as follows: 
 
 
9(1) Those [individuals] whose 
military trial proceedings have not 
concluded: cases under investigation are to 
be transferred to civil prosecutors for 
investigation and cases at trial are to be 
transferred to civilian courts for trial. 
 
 
9(2) Those [individuals] whose 
criminal sentences have already been 
decided may not appeal or complain to 
civil courts.  However, those with grounds 
for retrial or extraordinary appeal may in 
accordance to the law petition for retrial or 
extraordinary appeal. 
 
 
9(3) Those [individuals] whose 
criminal sentences have not begun or who 
are currently serving their sentences are to 
be transferred to and administered by 
civilian prosecutors. 
                                            
47 Guojia Anquan Fa (國家安全法 ) [National Security Act], FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (1987) 
(amended 2013), http://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0030028 [hereinafter 
National Security Act]. 
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The implications of this article for Taiwan’s post-transition engagement 
with human rights abuses were, and still are, tremendous.  First, paragraphs 1 
and 3 transfer control of civilian investigations, trials, and prisoners to civil 
jurisdiction.  Though fewer than in previous decades, by the mid-1980s there 
were still numerous civilians imprisoned and awaiting trial in military courts 
for political crimes.48  The transfer of such cases to civilian courts was an 
initial step to demilitarize society. 
 
However, more problematic was the fact that paragraph 2 of the 
National Security Act nullified Article 10 of the original Martial Law Act, 
which explicitly provided an automatic right of appeal for any and all 
convictions of non-military persons under courts-martial during times of 
emergency.  Thus, paragraph 2 of Article 9 in the National Security Act 
effectively precluded civilians who were tried for political offenses under 
martial law or their families from appealing their convictions to civil courts.  
By passing this law, the KMT not only insulated itself from potential 
retribution and legal accountability, but also severely restricted the right of 
tens of thousands of citizens to question the legality of military trials 
conducted against civilians during the White Terror period. 
 
The constitutionality of the National Security Act’s Article 9 was 
immediately questioned by three civilians who had previously been convicted 
for political offenses by military courts. 49  Their request for a constitutional 
interpretation went all the way to the Constitutional Court in 1987.50  The 
Court, staffed by KMT appointees, sided with the government and confirmed 
the constitutionality of the legislation.51  The Court held, inter alia, that due to 
the lengthy period of martial law,52 the inaccessibility of documents related to 
individual case reports resulting from the long lapse of time,53 and the need to 
retain the stability and consistency of the judicial process,54 the reinvestigation 
                                            
48 Taiwan Ends 4 Decades of Martial Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1987/07/15/world/taiwan-ends-4-decades-of-martial-law.html (citing the Taiwan Defense Ministry’s 
statement that it released twenty-three individuals and only thirty dissidents remained in custody). 
49 J.Y. Interpretation No. 272, JIESHI (Const. Ct. Jan. 18, 1991) http://www.judicial.gov.tw/ 
constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=272. 
50 Id. 
51 For the Chinese-language version of the judgment, see Sifa Yuan (司法院) [Judicial Yuan], Sifa 
Yuan Shi Zi 272 Hao Jieshi (司法院釋字 272號解釋) [Explanation of Interpretation 272 of the Judicial 
Yuan], 129 FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (法務部公報) [MINISTRY JUST. GAZETTE] 100 (1991). 
52 Id. at 100. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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and retrial of all such cases were simply beyond the capacity of civilian 
courts.55 
 
Thus, by arguing for consistency and stability, the Court recused itself 
from involvement in early efforts to promote transitional justice in Taiwan.  
Furthermore, by not questioning the legality of the acts or judgments called 
into question by the case, the Court tacitly validated and legitimized the 
human rights abuses perpetrated by KMT officials during the martial law 
period in Interpretation No. 272.  Although the post-transition KMT-
dominated legislature would later pass three transitional justice acts in the 
1990s, the passage of the National Security Act and its judicial support clearly 
set the restrictive tone for transitional justice discourse and practice during the 
early years of post-authoritarian Taiwan.56 
 
C. The Conservative Language of Transitional Justice Legislation 
Under the KMT 
 
Although the KMT initially feared retribution from the populace, the 
party continued to win democratic elections.  The KMT, therefore, controlled 
both the legislature (1987–2016) and the presidency (1987–2000). By 
extension, therefore, the KMT controlled the official government position on 
transitional justice matters during the initial two decades of democracy in 
Taiwan. 
 
During this time, the KMT-dominated legislature introduced three 
important (but limited) pieces of legislation related to transitional justice.  The 
conservative language and narrow scope of these laws highlight the 
constraints placed on transitional justice mechanisms by local post-transition 
political conditions.  It was in these conditions that the former authoritarian 
party retained much of its political power.  Although the limitations of these 
initial measures drew much criticism from the victims of the White Terror 
period and left a feeling of the incompleteness of transitional justice in Taiwan, 
there was little that could be done in terms of formal legislative approaches to 
transitional justice while the KMT held its dominance in the legislature.  This 
section analyzes the limitations of the KMT promulgated laws in 
chronological order of their passage. 
 
                                            
55 Id. 
56  Hwang, supra note 5, at 171. 
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The first piece of post-transition legislation specifically aimed at past 
abuses was the 1995 Act Governing the Recovery of Damage of Individual 
Rights During the Period of Martial Rule (“1995 Recovery Act”).57  This Act 
specifically covers individual cases occurring during the period between May 
20, 1949 and July 14, 1987 in which the defendants were either charged but 
found not guilty in courts-martial or were found guilty but can subsequently 
prove their confessions were coerced.58  In addition to monetary reparations 
for those who can prove their trials were carried out improperly,59 the Act 
further provides for the full restoration of individual rights, allowing affected 
persons to hold civil office or re-enter professional fields such as medicine, 
law, and education.60  Though this Act provides some quantum of reparation 
for the abuses of the past, its language necessarily constrains the applicable 
cases to those occurring during the period of 1949–1987, thereby excluding 
the victims of the 228 Incident.  Furthermore, while some confessions may be 
proven to have been coerced and their subsequent verdicts determined to be 
unjust, the language of the Act establishes this as an administrative failing, 
not an illegal or immoral act.  Nowhere in the Act is the legality of the courts-
martial system utilized against civilians during martial law ever questioned.61  
And finally, the Act is silent on the question of fact-finding for the purpose of 
assigning responsibility and accountability for the incidents occurring during 
the White Terror period. 
 
The second major piece of transitional justice legislation was the 1995 
February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act (“228 Compensation 
Act”).62  For nearly forty years, the KMT had suppressed discussion of the 
228 Incident; yet with democratization and the re-establishment of civil 
freedoms of speech and press, the KMT found itself unable to escape the 
influence of this event. 63   Unlike the “legal” use of courts-martial and 
suppression of individual rights under martial rule, the KMT government 
                                            
57 Jieyan Shiqi Renmin ShouSun Quanli Huifu Tiaoli (戒嚴時期人民受損權利回復條例) [Act 
Governing the Recovery of Damage of Individual Rights During the Period of Martial Law], FAWUBU FAGUI 
ZILIAOKU (1995) (amended 2000), http://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode= 
A0000007. 
58 Id. art 1. 
59 Id. art 6. 
60 Id. art 3. 
61 Hwang, supra note 5, at 172. 
62 Ererba Shijian Chuli ji Buchang Tiaoli (二二八事件處理及補償條例) [The February 28 Incident 
Disposition and Compensation Act], FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (1995) (amended 2013), 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=I0020013 [hereinafter The February 28 Incident 
Disposition and Compensation Act]. 
63 Wang & Ku, supra note 5, at 10–11. 
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brutality against the Taiwanese population in the aftermath of the 228 Incident 
lacked any legal basis. 
 
The memory of the event continued to be a heavily contentious issue, 
dividing the population between those living in Taiwan prior to the 1945 
retrocession and those arriving from the mainland after the retrocession.  This 
Act, therefore, was specifically aimed at the victims of the 228 Incident, and 
one can argue that this piece of legislation was part of President Lee Tung-
hui’s ongoing attempt to close the identity gap among Taiwan’s population.64  
This is reflected in the initial article of the Act that provides the rationale for 
the legislation, which is “to cause citizens to understand the facts of the 
incident, to heal historical wounds, and to promote ethnic unity and 
harmony.”65  Such a statement is tantamount to an acknowledgment of the 
individual and social harm inflicted by the incident, yet its efficacy is again 
limited by the carefully crafted language which does not offer any 
identification of those individuals actually responsible for its occurrence.  
Here, again, the language of the legislation shelters individual members of the 
KMT from criminal or civil liability or even official acknowledgment of their 
participation. 
 
To promote transitional justice, the Act provides for the establishment 
of a schedule of reparation payments,66 a system to provide the restitution of 
honor for victims or the descendants of those killed, wounded, tortured, 
detained, or imprisoned, and compensation for individuals or their families 
who had property damaged or confiscated during the period of state-
sanctioned violence. 67  Unlike the previous piece of legislation, however, 
which focused primarily on reparations, the 228 Compensation Act provides 
for the establishment of additional formal transitional justice mechanisms. 
 
Article 3, for example, establishes the 228 Incident Memorial 
Foundation (“Foundation”), which is to be governed by a selection of scholars, 
civil activists, and victims of the incident (or their descendants).  Individual 
                                            
64 MELISSA J. BROWN, IS TAIWAN CHINESE?: THE IMPACT OF CULTURE, POWER, AND MIGRATION ON 
CHANGING IDENTITIES 12 (2004); see generally Stéphane Corcuff, The Symbolic Dimension of 
Democratization and the Transition of National Identity Under Lee Teng-hui, in MEMORIES OF THE FUTURE: 
NATIONAL IDENTITY ISSUES AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW TAIWAN 92 (Stéphane Corcuff ed., Routledge 2015) 
(2002). 
65 The February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act art. 1 (“使國民瞭解事件真相, 撫平
歷史傷痛,促進族群融和”). 
66 Id. art. 7. 
67 Id. art. 6. 
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applications for reparations and restitution of honor are submitted directly to 
the Foundation, which in turn investigates each claim and administers 
financial reparations.68  Furthermore, the Foundation promotes truth-finding 
through research exercises, and provides educational awareness of the 
incident via events and publications. 69   Article 4 of the Act provides an 
additional measure of commemorative transitional justice by confirming the 
annual date of February 28 as a national holiday, Peace Memorial Day (和平
紀念日). 
 
Like the previous piece of legislation, however, the 228 Compensation 
Act is limited in actually providing justice to victims.  The very title of the 
Act created controversy.  This is because it uses the term bu chang (補償) for 
“compensation,” which in Taiwanese administrative law implies a form of 
compensation for harms resulting out of a legitimate process or procedure.70  
This word choice reflects the continued stance of the KMT-dominated 
legislature that the “wrongness” of the abuses was linked to individualized 
cases of administrative failings of an otherwise legal and legitimate system. 
 
Relatedly, the KMT’s enduring platform of the legality of its 
governance methods during the 228 Incident is also evident in the fierce 
legislative debates over the inclusion of the phrase “the government should 
apologize to all citizens.”  In the end, however, inclusion of the phrase was 
voted down.71  The KMT could have viewed the possible inclusion of such an 
explicit statement in a piece of legislation as an admission of wrongdoing.  
This could undermine its continued stance over the legitimacy of its 
government prior to and during the martial law period.  Thus, while the 228 
Compensation Act clearly differs from the 1995 Recovery Act by providing 
reparations, establishing a foundation tasked with specific transitional justice 
goals, and assigning February 28 as a national holiday, the language of both 
Acts precludes ascribing any liability or blame to the KMT or any individual 
associated with the authoritarian government. 
 
The final major piece of transitional justice legislation passed by the 
KMT-dominated legislature was the 1998 Compensation Act for Improper 
Trials on Charges of Sedition and Espionage During the Martial Law Period 
                                            
68 Id. arts. 6, 7. 
69 Id. art. 11. 
70 Wang & Ku, supra note 5, at 12–13. 
71 Id. at 12. 
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(“1998 Compensation Act”). 72   This Act was the direct result of public 
dissatisfaction with the KMT government and legislature’s lack of efforts to 
properly address the abuses occurring during the White Terror period. 73  
However, despite the public pressure for more comprehensive transitional 
justice legislation, the 1998 Compensation Act follows the KMT’s trend of 
legislating compensatory acts while precluding any inquiries over the 
legitimacy of KMT rule or assigning any liability to specific individuals. 
 
Like the 228 Compensation Act, this Act establishes another memorial 
foundation comprised of scholars, civilians, judges, and government 
representatives.  The foundation is tasked with administering the applications, 
investigations of claims, and payments to victims or their families.74  The 
legislation is quite limited in its scope, as it only covers individuals tried and 
convicted of sedition (pan luan, 叛亂) or espionage (fei die, 匪諜) during the 
martial law period.75  This limitation is further evidenced by a preclusion of 
individuals who have already received any form of compensation via the 228 
Compensation Act or who have received some measure of compensation via 
the administrative appeal system for wrongful conviction.76  The same article 
also bars any individual whose conviction could be upheld after 
reconsideration from compensation. 
 
All three pieces of transitional justice legislation represent the KMT’s 
attempts to formally address its past wrongs primarily through legislating 
reparations to victims.  However, due to its continued control of the legislature, 
the KMT directly controlled transitional legislation and was able to further 
insulate itself from any official liability for past abuses during its authoritarian 
rule. 
 
Each law contains a similar set of limitations.  First, the scope of each 
law is temporally limited with explicit language confining the applicability of 
each law’s provisions to a specific period of time.  All three are limited to the 
period of KMT rule following the retrocession in 1945.  As such, harms and 
                                            
72 Jieyan Shiqi Budang Panluan Ji Feidie Shenpan Anjian Bushang Tiaoli (戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪
諜審判案件補償條例) [Compensation Act for Wrongful Trials on Charges of Sedition and Espionage 
During the Martial Law Period], FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (1998) (amended 2006), http://law.moj.gov.tw/ 
ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=F0120018. 
73 Hwang, supra note 5, at 172. 
74 The February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act art. 3. 
75 Id. art. 2. 
76 Id. art. 3. 
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losses that occurred during the Japanese colonial period are not considered or 
applicable.  This precludes numerous claims from Taiwan’s indigenous 
communities. 
 
Second, the primary focus of all three laws is on reparations as a means 
of reconciliation.77  The 228 Compensation Act and 1995 Recovery Act both 
commemorate forms of transitional justice by establishing memorial 
foundations and promoting educational events occurring during KMT rule; 
however, the function of such acts is to understand the events and assist the 
victims without consideration of responsibility. 
 
This relates to the third restriction, which is a limitation on ascertaining 
the “truth.”  Unlike many transitional societies, the KMT never established a 
truth and reconciliation committee to determine the sources of and 
responsibility for abuse.  To do so would call into question the legitimacy of 
state-sanctioned violence during the authoritarian period.  Thus, not a single 
individual has been prosecuted for acts committed during the period from 
1945 to 1987.  Instead, each law acknowledges the loss and/or harm inflicted 
on the civilian populace.  Thus, while the transitional justice legislation passed 
by the KMT did provide financial benefits to many of those who had suffered 
under KMT oppression, the language was crafted in such a way as to elude 
consideration of the accountability or criminal liability of the perpetrators. 
 
D. Continued Public Dissatisfaction with KMT-Led Transitional 
Justice: 2000–2016 
 
The early years of democratic rule in Taiwan saw many positive 
changes; yet lurking in the background was the ever-present specter of the 
past and a palpable public dissatisfaction with the state of KMT-dominated 
transitional justice practice.  In 2000, the KMT’s dominance was tested when 
the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) won the presidential election and 
was re-elected by a razor-thin margin in 2004.  However, despite the DPP’s 
success in gaining the presidency, the party was never able to eclipse the KMT 
coalition majority (known as the “Pan-Blue” coalition) within the 
legislature.78  As a result, Chen Shui-bian’s two terms in office were fraught 
with persistent policy gridlock between the DPP-held executive and KMT-
                                            
77 Jemima García-Godos, Reparations, in AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, 
at 177, 182–85. 
78 Shiow-duan Hawang, Executive-Legislative Relations Under Divided Government, in TAIWAN’S 
DEMOCRACY CHALLENGED: THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN YEARS, supra note 40, at 123. 
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held legislature, with the latter opposing nearly all government proposals 
requiring legislative approval.79 
 
There were, however, some small legislative victories for the DPP-led 
attempt at transitional justice.  First, in 2007, an amendment altered the title 
of the 228 Compensation Act.  As mentioned previously, the former title 
utilized the term bu chang for “compensation,” indicating an administrative 
compensation for harm resulting from a legal act.  With very little media 
attention or legislative debate, the amendment changed the term to pei chang 
(賠償), which denotes a form of compensation for a harm resulting from an 
illegal act.80  This subtle shift in title implies that the acts perpetrated under 
the guise of government-sanctioned legality were in fact illegal acts for which 
the government at the time should be held responsible.  Unfortunately, Chen 
had little power or influence over the judiciary and other government offices, 
and this change in title and its significance went unnoticed. 
 
Second, in 2003 and 2007, the Constitutional Court issued two 
interpretations concerning the constitutionality of victim-category exclusions 
enshrined in Taiwan’s existing transitional justice legislation.  In 2003, the 
Court issued Interpretation No. 567, which held that, despite the extraordinary 
circumstances of martial law, the military courts’ continued use of 
rehabilitative labor for civilians after the completion of their prison sentences 
during this period violated Article 8 of the ROC Constitution. 81  Furthermore, 
the original implementation of the 1995 Recovery Act in conjunction with the 
1987 National Security Act prevented such individuals from receiving 
compensation.  This ruling expanded the scope of the 1995 Recovery Act and 
implicitly labeled the KMT government’s use of indefinite rehabilitation 
detention during the martial law period as unconstitutional.  In 2007, the Court 
issued Interpretation No. 624, which held that precluding civilians wrongfully 
convicted in military courts from receiving compensation was 
unconstitutional.82  The original wording of the 1987 National Security Act 
                                            
79 Thomas Weishing Huang, The President Refuses to Cohabit: Semi-Presidentialism in Taiwan, 15 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 375, 384 (2006). 
80 Legislative Yuan, Ererba shijian chuli ji peichang tiaoli de san du (二二八事件處理及賠償條例
的三讀) [Third Reading of the February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act], LIFA YUAN 
GONGBAO (立法院公報) [LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE], Mar. 21, 2007, at 88, 93. 
81 J.Y. Interpretation No. 567, JIESHI (Const. Ct. Oct. 24, 2003), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/ 
constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=567. 
82 J.Y. Interpretation No. 624, JIESHI (Const. Ct. Apr. 24, 2007), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/ 
constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=624. 
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only provided paid compensation for those who were detained but could prove 
themselves innocent, and this proof was limited to those who had not carried 
out their sentence.  Additionally, the wording of the 1995 Recovery Act 
further precluded individuals convicted in courts-martial who had completed 
their sentences from equal reparation payments.  Therefore, the Court ordered 
such cases to be reconsidered. 
 
Both rulings greatly expanded the scope of victim claimants under the 
three pieces of transitional justice legislation.  But, like the lawmakers in the 
KMT-dominated legislature, the Court stopped short of making an explicit 
statement about the responsibility or liability of any individual person or 
group for the wrongs committed under KMT rule. 
 
Lastly, as Chen Shui-bian neared the end of his final term in office, he 
called for a national referendum on transitional justice in an attempt to push a 
legislative agenda that would deal with KMT party assets.  These assets were 
a key reason for the KMT’s continued political resilience after 
democratization.  During the martial law period, the KMT government 
utilized dubious forms of confiscation of personal wealth and property from 
political opponents, procured large swaths of land via land grabs, and 
established numerous state-owned (i.e., KMT-owned) enterprises protected 
by government monopolies.83  As a result, over its forty years in power, the 
KMT amassed an enormous portfolio of assets, including cash reserves, rental 
properties, and corporations. 84   The KMT’s ability to shield these assets 
during the transition period allowed the party to retain a great deal of political 
influence.  No other political party (the first new party being allowed to form 
in 1988) could compete with the KMT’s wealth.85 
 
                                            
83 TIEN, supra note 34, at 86–87. 
84 Some have argued that the KMT assets are worth roughly NT$150 billion. The KMT’s own 
government financial disclosures provide net worth estimates of NT$33.1 billion in 2005 and NT$25.6 billion 
in 2013. For an analysis of the political arguments over the KMT assets, see DAFYDD FELL, PARTY POLITICS 
IN TAIWAN: PARTY CHANGE AND THE DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION OF TAIWAN, 1991–2004, at 77–78 (2005). 
For analysis of the KMT’s own disclosures, see Jeang Bang-wen (蔣邦文), Yi di er ci zhengdang lun ti wei 
li, xi lun Taiwan zhuanxing zhengyi de shijian (以第二次政黨輪替為例,析論台灣轉型正義的實踐) [An 
Analysis of the Practice of Transitional Justice in Taiwan Using the Second Ruling Party Alternation as a 
Case Example], 7 TAIPEI HAIYANG JISHU XUEYUAN XUEBAO (台北海洋技術學院學報) [J. TAIPEI C. MAR. 
TECH.] 2 at 90, 100 (2016). 
85 Bang-wen, supra note 84, at 106 (citing official reports indicating that in 2013 the KMT held an 
estimated NT$25.6 billion in assets, while its primary competitor the DPP held an estimated NT$478.72 
million in assets). 
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The source of this political wealth was a contentious issue among the 
population, which believed the assets should be returned to those who lost 
them during the martial law period, or to their families.  In 2000, Chen Shui-
bian attempted to push through a legislative bill that would force the KMT to 
return all assets gained illicitly during the martial law period.  However, this 
bill did not have a chance given the continued KMT control over the 
legislature.86  Towards the end of his final year in office, in an effort to frame 
the upcoming presidential election campaign around the issues of transitional 
justice and KMT party assets, and to instigate a renewed drive for further 
transitional justice legislation, Chen called for a public referendum.  The 
language of Chen’s referendum question was posed as follows: 
 
Original English Translation 
你是否同意依下列原則制定
「政黨不當取得財產處理條例」，
將中國國民黨黨產還給全民： 
 
 
 
 
國民黨及其附隨組織的財
產，除黨費、政治獻金及競選補
助金外，均推定為不當取得的財
產，應還給人民。已處分者，應
償還價額。 
Do you agree that the 
following principles should be 
adhered to when legislating an 
Administration of Illicitly 
Acquired Assets of Political 
Parties Act for the purpose of 
returning to the people the party 
assets of the Kuomintang? 
 
The properties of the 
Kuomintang and its affiliate 
organizations—excluding party 
dues, political donations, and public 
electoral subsidies—should all be 
presumed illicitly acquired and 
ought to be returned to the people.  
That which has already been 
liquidated, the [KMT] ought to 
compensate at market value. 
 
Like Chen’s other attempts to further transitional justice practice in 
Taiwan, the referendum was thwarted, but this time not directly by the KMT.  
Instead, the referendum was defeated by low voter turnout—only 26.34% of 
                                            
86 Kuo Cheng-tian (郭承天), Taiwan zhuan xing zhengyi yanjiu de zhuanxing (台灣轉型正義研究的
轉型) [Research in Transition on Taiwan’s Transitional Justice], 12 TAIWAN ZHENGZHI XUE KAN (台灣政
治學刊) [TAIWANESE POL. SCI. REV.] 3, 6 (2008). 
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registered voters participated. 87   This fell well below the 50% threshold 
required by the Referendum Act,88 and thus nullified the results. 
 
Despite its failure, the language of the referendum represents an explicit 
attempt by the DPP government to directly associate the KMT with illegal 
activities during the martial law period.  The referendum question does not 
discuss the physical harms inflicted on individuals under the KMT regime, 
but it does address the property and financial harms inflicted on the Taiwanese 
populace from which the KMT continued to benefit.  Although the 
referendum results were nullified, of the 4,550,881 individuals who voted, 
91.46% agreed with the proposal.89  This demonstrates a continuing public 
consciousness among a significant part of society that directly links the 
“incompleteness” of Taiwan’s transitional justice to the financial assets of the 
KMT, and, more specifically, the illegal means through which the KMT 
amassed such a fortune during the martial law period. 
 
Despite their attempts, Chen Shui-bian and the DPP could do little to 
legislate further transitional justice in Taiwan.  Public frustration with the DPP 
government’s inability to govern with the KMT-dominated legislature, and 
allegations against Chen for corruption, as well as later convictions of Chen 
and his family on those charges, led to a significant drop in the public’s 
opinion of the party.90 
 
With the election of KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) to the 
presidency in 2008 and 2012, the Taiwanese government and legislature 
reverted to full KMT control.  During Ma’s two terms in office, very little was 
accomplished in the way of formal transitional justice legislation.  Yet many 
of the KMT government policies—particularly those related to increased 
                                            
87 Press Release, Zhongyang Xuanju Weiyuanhui (中央選舉委員會) [Central Election Committee], 
Gonggao Quanguo Xing Gongmin Toupiao An Di 3 An, Di 4 An Liang Xiang Gongmin Toupiao An Toupiao 
Jieguo (公告全國性公民投票案第 3案、第 4案兩項公民投票案投票結果) [Public Announcement of the 
Voting Results of the National Referendum on Issue Number 3 and Issue Number 4] (2008), 
https://www.cec.gov.tw/central/cms/p_v_anno/3592. 
88 Gongmin Toupiao Fa (公民投票法) [Referendum Act], art. 30, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (2003) 
(amended 2009), http://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=D0020050 (requiring more 
than 50% of the voting population to participate, and more than 50% of those votes for a referendum to pass). 
89 Press Release, Central Election Committee, supra note 87. 
90 Bang-wen, supra note 84, at 104; Weitseng Chen & Jimmy Chia-shin Hsu, Horizontal 
Accountability and the Rule of Law, in TAIWAN’S DEMOCRACY CHALLENGED: THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN YEARS, 
supra note 40, at 145, 164–66. 
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economic relations with China—provoked a great deal of public outrage.91  
Eventually, the KMT found itself with extremely low opinion polls and 
dwindling popular support.  As a result, the combined presidential and 
legislative elections of 2016 provided hope that the DPP could not only win 
the presidency back, but also finally break nearly seventy years of KMT 
dominance over the legislature.92 
 
IV. A SECOND WAVE OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE LEGISLATION: THE DPP 
LEGISLATURE 
 
A. The 2016 Elections and Revisiting Transitional Justice 
 
In the heated campaign leading up to the 2016 presidential and 
legislative elections, the specter of past abuses at the hands of the KMT 
government and public dissatisfaction with the scope of extant transitional 
justice legislation became prime topics of debate.  The discourse often focused 
on two specific issues: the continued lack of accountability for the events that 
occurred during the White Terror period and the failure of previous 
governments to adequately confront the KMT over its financial assets 
acquired during the martial law period.93 
 
The campaign pledges of the DPP legislative candidates, and especially 
the presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), promised to deal with these 
two issues via specific transitional justice legislation.  For example, Tsai’s 
presidential campaign platform rested on “five pillars of reform,” of which the 
fourth was specifically dedicated to transitional justice.94  Tsai’s approach to 
transitional justice as political discourse focused on the KMT’s lack of 
accountability over its historical role in perpetrating abuses during the martial 
                                            
91 See generally John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, Taiwan in 2014: A Besieged President amid Political Turmoil, 
55 ASIAN SURV. 142 (2015). 
92 Cal Clark & Alexander C. Tan, Identity and Integration as Conflicting Forces Stimulating the 
Sunflower Movement and the Kuomintang’s Loss in the 2014 Elections, 2 CONTEMP. CHINESE POL. ECON. & 
STRATEGIC REL. 313, 314 (2016); Jeffrey T. Martin, Policing an Occupied Legislature: Symbolic Struggle 
over the Police Image in Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, 45 H.K. L.J. 229, 231–32 (2015).  
93 See, e.g., Christian Schafferer, Transitional Justice in Taiwan: An Austrian Perspective, 6 J. 
CONTEMP. EASTERN ASIA 17, 17 (2017).  See generally Christian Schafferer, Debating “Unpopular” Issues 
in Taiwan, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA: A HUMAN-CENTERED APPROACH TO 
EVALUATING DEMOCRACY 130 (Brendan Howe ed., 2015). 
94 Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), Wuda zhengzhi gaige (五大政治改革) [Five Major Political Reforms], 
DIAN LIANG TAIWAN (點亮台灣) [LIGHT UP TAIWAN] (Aug. 16, 2015), http://iing.tw/posts/51, translated in 
VOTE 2016: Tsai Ing-wen’s Five Major Reforms, THINKING TAIWAN (Sept. 17, 2015), http://iing.tw/en/21. 
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law period, as well as the methods by which the KMT gained its vast financial 
assets. 
 
This approach is reflected in three key elements of her published 
transitional justice political platform.  The first element offered a measure of 
acknowledgement of the suffering Taiwan’s indigenous communities had 
endured not only at the hands of the Republic of China government, but also 
at the hands of Japanese colonialists.  Tsai promised that, if elected, she would 
“offer an official apology to Aborigines on behalf of the government,”95 an 
act quite similar to the one made by former president Lee Tung-hui to victims 
of the 228 Incident.  Second, Tsai pledged that, if elected, her government 
would “bravely face the past,” for: 
 
We will not neglect errors because they are in the past.  Likewise, 
because past rulers used national violence to hurt and bully the 
citizens, we have the historical wounds of [the] 228 [Massacre] 
and the White Terror.  We can forgive, but we cannot forget.  We 
must face up to it, and we cannot allow this history to be 
tampered with.96 
 
The third element specifically promised to deal with the illicitly gained assets 
of the KMT, which Tsai opines “is the greatest defect in Taiwanese 
democracy,” primarily because it “prevents fair competition between 
parties.”97 
 
Each of these campaign pledges reflects the significant legislative gaps 
in Taiwan’s transitional justice experience.  As already noted, these gaps 
existed primarily due to the KMT’s ability to hold a legislative majority after 
democratization, and thereby insulate its members and assets from any 
potential legislative drafts attempting to ascribe individual accountability or 
threatening to investigate and seize the party’s financial assets.  Mindful of 
Chen Shui-bian’s past ineffectiveness at legislating transitional justice via a 
KMT-dominated legislature, Tsai ended her platform’s discussion of 
transitional justice with the qualifying statement that a positive future required 
not just the presidency, but also required “progressive forces” to “win a 
legislative majority.”98 
                                            
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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That is exactly what happened for Tsai and the DPP.  Tsai Ing-wen took 
the presidency with 56.1% of the vote, easily outdistancing her opponents—
KMT candidate Eric Chu (朱立倫) received 31% and People’s First Party 
candidate James Soong (宋楚瑜 ) received 12.8%. 99   More importantly, 
however, the DPP won a legislative majority for the first time in Taiwan’s 
democratic history.  The 2016 legislative election results saw the DPP 
increase their seats from 40 to 68 (with 57 needed for a majority in the 113 
seat Legislative Yuan), while the KMT representation nearly halved from 64 
seats to only 35 seats.100  This allows the DPP to initiate and pass legislation 
without the need for direct negotiations with the KMT in order to obtain the 
required majority votes to pass a bill.  For transitional justice in Taiwan, the 
election meant that for the first time any aspect of Taiwan’s authoritarian past 
had a fair chance of legislative consideration and the KMT would be unable 
to stop any legislative bill reaching the floor for a final reading. 
 
In her inaugural speech, President Tsai reiterated the importance of 
transitional justice for Taiwan as a society to move forward.  She stated that 
“the goal of transitional justice is to pursue true social reconciliation, so that 
all Taiwanese can take to heart the mistakes of that era.”101  Throughout the 
speech, the scope of transitional justice was clearly expanded to reflect 
society’s palpable discontent with the limited scope and time frame of the 
KMT legislation.  The goals laid out by Tsai’s inaugural address focused on 
investigation and truth-finding as key mechanisms for social reconciliation, 
and also diverged from previous practice by specifically highlighting the 
transitional and historical justice issues of Taiwan’s indigenous 
communities. 102   With control over the legislature, presidency, and 
executive,103 the DPP legislators wasted little time in submitting two pieces of 
legislation in an attempt to fulfill some of Tsai’s campaign promises during 
the much anticipated “first 100 days.” 
 
                                            
99 2016 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election, CENT. ELECTION COMMISSION, 
http://www.cec.gov.tw/english/cms/pe/24835. 
100 2016 Legislator Election, CENT. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.cec.gov.tw/english/cms/le/ 
24843. 
101 Tsai Ing-wen, President, Republic of China (Taiwan), Inaugural Address (May 20, 2016), translated 
in Inaugural Address of ROC 14th-Term President Tsai Ing-wen, OFF. PRESIDENT REPUBLIC CHINA (TAIWAN) 
(May 20, 2016), http://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/4893. 
102 Id. 
103 Taiwan has a semi-presidential system in which the popularly elected president selects a prime 
minister who is responsible for the executive branch of government. JIUNN-RONG YEH, THE CONSTITUTION 
OF TAIWAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 57–71 (2016). 
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B. Re-Legislating Transitional Justice: DPP Legislative Efforts 
 
1.  Political Party Assets and Affiliates 
 
Although the DPP caucus proposed two transitional justice bills to the 
legislature, the first to pass, and possibly the most contentious, was the 2016 
Act Governing the Handling of Illicit Assets of Political Parties and Their 
Affiliates (“2016 Illicit Assets Act”).104  Reflecting both Tsai’s desire to create 
a level playing field for all of Taiwan’s political parties and the public’s 
continued disapproval of the wealth of the KMT, the 2016 Illicit Assets Act 
specifically targets party assets acquired from 1945 to 1987—the years in 
which the KMT held an authoritarian monopoly on political power and the 
formation of other political parties was illegal.  Furthermore, because the 
KMT did not hold all of its assets in name, but utilized several affiliate 
institutions and organizations to both acquire and manage assets, the original 
bill was broadened to include “affiliates” (fusui zuzhi, 附隨組織 ).  The 
legislative sessions in which the bill was debated were fraught with high 
tempers, as the KMT, unable to stop the bill’s eventual passage with its 
minority, attempted to use all available procedural maneuvers to stall the bill’s 
passage.105  It further attempted to sway public opinion against the bill through 
a media campaign that labeled the 2016 Illicit Assets Act as the beginnings of 
an era of “Green Terror” (lüse kongbu, 綠色恐怖), with green being the color 
traditionally associated with the DPP.106  These attempts, however, failed, and 
the bill passed its third reading in an extraordinary legislative session on July 
25, 2016. 
 
The 2016 Illicit Assets Act is comprised of thirty-four individual 
articles organized in five chapters.  The Act clearly outlines its transitional 
justice objectives.  The initial article defines the purpose of the Act as “to 
investigate and deal with those party assets and the assets of affiliates illicitly 
obtained; establish an equal and fair competitive environment for all political 
                                            
104 Zhengdang Qi Qi Fu Sui Zuzhi Budang Qude Caichan Chuli Tiaoli (政黨及其附隨組織不當取得
財產處理條例) [Act Governing the Handling of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate 
Organizations], FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (2016), http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx? 
PCode=A0030286. 
105 Christie Chen & Kuei-hsiang Wen, Taiwan’s KMT Blocks Second Reading of Illicit Party Assets 
Bill, FOCUS TAIWAN (July 16, 2016), http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201607160008.aspx. 
106 Abraham Gerber, Lawmakers Scuffle amid Assets Debate, TAIPEI TIMES (June 9, 2016), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/06/09/2003648210. 
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parties; institute a fully-fledged democracy; and further the implementation of 
transitional justice.”107  To accomplish this, the Act calls for the establishment 
of a committee under the Executive comprised of eleven to thirteen 
individuals selected by the Prime Minister and serving four-year terms.108  To 
ensure fairness in proceedings, membership drawn from those with party 
affiliations may not exceed one third of the total for any single party.109  The 
Act also restricts any member of the committee who is also a member of a 
political party from engaging in any party meetings or events while serving as 
a committee member.110 
 
The Illicit Assets Committee meets once per month and is tasked with 
investigating and compiling information on alleged illicit assets, as well as 
seizing and, if possible, reinstating such properties to their original owner.111  
To do this, the Act provides the Committee with broad powers such as directly 
requesting information from political parties and government offices, sending 
representatives to political party headquarters and government offices to 
obtain documentation, and sending written requests for interviews with 
individuals.112  In addition to these powers, the Committee can also issue fines 
to political parties or their affiliates if they are found to be obstructing an 
investigation or attempting to liquidate assets under investigation. 
 
Related to this, the Act requires political parties and their affiliates that 
were active during the period of 1945–1987 to issue full reports of all assets 
clearly stating the asset value, asset origins (with evidence), date of 
acquisition, and evidence of means of transfer. 113   Furthermore, the Act 
prohibits political parties from liquidating any assets under investigation 
without approval of the Illicit Assets Committee.114 
 
Since its formation under the leadership of Wellington Koo (Koo Li-
hsiung, 顧立雄), the Illicit Assets Committee has actively pursued the KMT’s 
vast financial resources.  The Committee has frozen nearly all of the KMT’s 
                                            
107 Act Governing the Handling of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate 
Organizations art 1 (“為調查及處理政黨，附隨組織及其受託管理人不當取得之財產，建立政黨公平
競爭環境，健全民主政治，以落實轉型正義”). 
108 Id. arts. 2, 18. 
109 Id. art. 18. 
110 Id. art. 20. 
111 Id. art. 2. 
112 Id. art. 10. 
113 Id. art. 8. 
114 Id. art. 9. 
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bank accounts, making it difficult for the KMT to pay its employee salaries, 
and has also begun the process of investigating the political party’s vast 
property empire.115  It is still too early to measure the extent to which the 
Committee’s activities will contribute to the public’s sense of transitional 
justice; however, since its formation, the Committee has endeavored to fulfill 
Tsai’s pledge of dismantling the KMT’s vast financial resources to create a 
more equitable and competitive environment for multi-party democratic 
elections. 
 
2. The Promotion of Transitional Justice Bill 
 
In addition to the Illicit Assets Act, the DPP caucus also submitted a 
Promotion of Transitional Justice Bill (“Transitional Justice Bill”) 116 
specifically targeting the knowledge gap of victims, abusers, and perpetrators 
during the White Terror period.117  However, much to the disappointment of 
many involved, after the passage of the 2016 Illicit Assets Act, the 
Transitional Justice Bill stalled in the Legislative Yuan.118  Transitional justice 
is merely one issue currently confronting the DPP government, and other 
legislative bills related to the economy, environment, and increasingly hostile 
cross-straits relations have taken priority.119 
 
Recently, Tsai reiterated her hopes that the bill would pass; however, 
efforts in the Executive Yuan appeared to indicate that the fate of this bill was 
                                            
115 Chen Wei-han, Committee Freezes KMT Bank Account, TAIPEI TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/09/22/2003655671. 
116 This bill passed its third reading in the Legislative Yuan on December 5, 2017. I am extremely 
grateful to the Washington International Law Journal editorial team for allowing me to update this section of 
the Article very late into the editing process to include some initial comments on this most recent piece of 
transitional justice legislation. 
117 At the time of writing, this act has not yet been formally promulgated by the Office of the President. 
As such, I rely on the “unofficial” bill version available on the Legislative Yuan’s website. See Bill Report, 
Min Jin Dang Dangtuan (民進黨黨團) [DPP Caucus], Cujin Zhuanxing Zhengyi Tiaoli Caoan (促進轉型正
義 條 例 草 案 ) [Promotion of Transitional Justice Bill] (Mar. 30, 2016), 
http://lci.ly.gov.tw/LyLCEW/agenda1/02/pdf/09/01/07/LCEWA01_090107_00045.pdf. 
118 Lee Hsin-fang, Su Urged to Act on Transitional Justice, TAIPEI TIMES (May 31, 2017), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/05/31/2003671625. 
119 Two significant areas of reform that have required a great deal of cross-party negotiation are labor 
reform, specifically reforms to the Labor Standards Act (勞動基準法), and the much debated Forward-
looking Infrastructure Development Bill (前瞻基礎建設特別條例). See Lauly Li, Fang-ho Su & Jonathan 
Chin, Infrastructure Review Blocked by KMT Protest, TAIPEI TIMES (May 4, 2017), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/05/04/2003669918; Chen Wei-han, NPP Urges 
Cabinet Again to Talk Labor Law Amendments, TAIPEI TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/11/15/2003682290. 
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uncertain.120  As early as her inaugural speech, Tsai exhibited some skepticism 
over the future of the bill, and later announced that she intended to establish a 
truth and reconciliation committee within the president’s office.121  Relatedly, 
Tsai pledged to establish a commission to produce the first ever 
comprehensive account of the White Terror period.122  Yet, without supporting 
legislative authority, it would be difficult to speculate how effective 
presidential committees could be at locating and obtaining documentation 
related to the abuses that occurred under martial law.123  Despite the stalling 
of the Transitional Justice Bill in the legislature, President Tsai seemed 
adamant to complete her campaign and inaugural speech pledges to fill the 
“gaps” in Taiwan’s transitional justice experience. 
 
To the surprise of this author and many others, very late in Taiwan’s 
2017 fall legislative session, the DPP managed to push the Transitional Justice 
Bill through its third and final reading.124  The newly passed 2017 Promotion 
of Transitional Justice Act functions much the same as the 2016 Illicit Assets 
Act.  The Act covers the period from August 15, 1945 to November 6, 1992.125  
The Act provides for the establishment of a truth commission under the 
Executive Yuan, consisting of nine individuals selected by the Prime Minister 
and confirmed by the Legislative Yuan.126  This article also sets limits on the 
number of committee members from any single political party and sets a quota 
for gender representation.127  Furthermore, all members of the committee are 
                                            
120 Tsai Ing-wen, President, Republic of China, Inaugural Anniversary Address (May 19, 2017), 
translated in President Tsai Meets Delegation of Overseas Chinese-Language Media, OFF. PRESIDENT 
REPUBLIC CHINA (TAIWAN) (May 19, 2017), http://english.president.gov.tw/News/5144. 
121 Rowen & Rowen, supra note 5, at 1–3. 
122 Weng Lu-huang, Su Fang-ho & Jake Chung, White Terror Probe to be Finished in Three Years: 
Tsai, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 11, 2016), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/12/11/ 
2003660977. 
123 Bowman, supra note 14 (noting that much of Chen Shui-bian’s efforts to establish human rights and 
transitional justice mechanisms under the office of the president or the Executive Yuan were ineffective 
overall and easily dismantled when Ma Ying-jeou took the presidency). 
124 Su Longqi (蘇龍麒), Li Yuan San Du Xingzhengyuan She Cu Zhuanhui Chuli Zhuanxing Zhengyi 
(立院三讀行政院設促轉會處理轉型正義) [Third Reading in the Legislative Yuan: The Executive Yuan to 
Establish a Promotion of Transitional Justice Committee to Manage Transitional Justice], CNA NEWS (Dec. 
5, 2017, 9:10 PM), http://m.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201712055006.aspx. 
125 Bill Report, DPP Caucus, supra note 117, art. 3. 
126 Id. art. 8. 
127 Id. (“However, among the total committee members, there shall be no more than 3 members from 
the same political party and there shall be no fewer than 3 members of both genders.” (但全體委員中,同一
政黨之人數不得逾三人;同一性別之人數不得少於三人)). 
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forbidden from participating in any political party activities while they are 
serving their terms.128 
 
The committee possesses a range of mandates and powers to collect 
from individuals, political parties, and government offices all available 
documentation relating to abuses occurring during the White Terror period.129  
The committee is also empowered to fine individuals, political parties, and 
government officials for obstructing investigations or destroying related files 
or other relevant documentation.130  At first blush, this Act seems to address 
some of the crucial “gaps” in knowledge about the events and abuses 
occurring during the White Terror period.  Yet unlike any previous 
transitional justice legislation, this Act also contains provisions allowing the 
committee to assign responsibility for acts committed during the White Terror 
period and provides a measure of punitive accountability for individuals. 
 
In perhaps the most striking example of the Act’s powers, it provides 
the committee with the authority to remove symbols of the authoritarian 
period.  The committee is authorized to remove numerous statues of Chiang 
Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, and is permitted to rename a large number 
of public sites, schools, and universities named after these figures.131  Moving 
quickly after the bill’s passage, Minister of Education Pan Wen-chung (潘文
忠) stated that he would meet with schools in Taiwan that are named after 
Chiang Kai-shek to discuss how the Transitional Justice Act requires them to 
remove the name.132  This is perhaps the most direct attempt to place blame 
on those public figures involved in the abuses under KMT rule. 
 
Additionally, the committee is empowered to revisit and retry cases 
from the White Terror period.  The committee is further authorized to provide 
various sanctions for those individuals who were complicit in perpetrating 
miscarriages of justice.133   Such measures focus on a form of procedural 
justice and administrative accountability of judicial and military personnel for 
improper trials of civilians during the authoritarian period.  They do not, 
                                            
128 Id. art. 12. 
129 Id. art. 3. 
130 Id. art. 16. 
131 Id. art. 5. 
132 William Hetherington, Transitional Justice Act: Schools Named After Chiang Kai-shek to be 
Renamed: Education Minister, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/ 
archives/2017/12/07/2003683572. 
133 Bill Report, DPP Caucus, supra note 117, art. 6. 
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however, extend to specific criminal trials of individuals.  Regardless, the 
2017 Promotion of Transitional Justice Act has greatly increased the scope of 
transitional justice within Taiwan.  How it will function in practice remains to 
be seen. 
 
The KMT has always been critical of the DPP version of the 
Transitional Justice Bill, and had even supplied its own version.134  After 
decades of limiting the legislative scope of transitional justice, it is now the 
KMT that criticizes the language and scope of transitional justice legislation 
produced by the DPP.  For example, KMT Chairman Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) 
voiced criticism of the temporal scope of the bill for only focusing on the 
period in which the KMT ruled Taiwan to the exclusion of the colonial periods 
of the Japanese, Dutch, and Spanish.135  Such narrowness once again leaves 
unresolved many issues related to transitional justice claims of Taiwan’s 
Austronesian peoples.  Furthermore, the KMT is critical of the 
constitutionality of the Transitional Justice Committee’s mandate that 
combines both executive and judicial powers.136  It seems likely that the KMT 
will soon attempt to petition the Constitutional Court to interpret the 
constitutionality of the Transitional Justice Act.137  At this point, however, the 
Transitional Justice Act exists and will be a key part of Taiwan’s future 
progress towards social reconciliation. 
 
V. REMAINING “GAPS” IN TAIWAN’S TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
 
There are clear differences in the scope and language of the KMT-era 
versus the DPP-era transitional justice legislation.  Because the KMT retained 
an elected majority in the legislature, it could directly control the official 
stance on transitional justice.  The former authoritarian party’s transitional 
justice legislation, therefore, emphasized reparations and limited 
acknowledgement, while precluding any consideration of criminal liability, 
individual accountability, or the necessity of amnesty.  The very fact that the 
KMT remained in power for so long after the democratic transition provided 
an unofficial amnesty to those who had perpetrated abuses during the 
authoritarian period.  Once the DPP won a legislative majority after twenty 
years of KMT dominance, for the first time the scope of transitional justice 
                                            
134 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
135 Jake Chung & Chen Wei-han, Transitional Justice Act: KMT Pans Transitional Justice Act, TAIPEI 
TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/12/07/2003683571. 
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legislation was unbound.  Therefore, the DPP legislation attempts to fill the 
“gaps” of accountability, knowledge, and finances, with specific legislative 
language. 
 
Yet not everyone is happy with the DPP’s transitional justice legislative 
agenda.  Like the KMT legislation, the DPP’s bills also contain language that 
limits the applicability of transitional justice measures.  Both the 2016 Illicit 
Assets Act and the Transitional Justice Act are temporally constrained to the 
period when the KMT ruled.  This excludes consideration of the transitional 
justice needs of those who suffered abuse and loss under Japanese colonialism 
(1895–1945), or even prior to the Japanese occupation. 
 
This excluded period is particularly troubling for Taiwan’s indigenous 
communities.  As the Japanese attempted to pacify the “savage aborigines,” 
many of these communities lost vast amounts of their land and fell victim to 
massacres at the hands of the Japanese.138  Although Tsai Ing-wen fulfilled her 
pledge to formally apologize to the indigenous communities on behalf of the 
national government, 139  the primary legislative proposals for transitional 
justice submitted by the DPP do not explicitly mention the issues and claims 
of Taiwan’s indigenous communities. 
 
As a result, numerous bills have been submitted to the Legislative Yuan 
explicitly dealing with “aboriginal transitional justice” (yuanzhumin 
zhuanxing zhengyi, 原住民轉型正義 ) or “aboriginal historical justice” 
(yuanzhumin lishi zhengyi, 原住民歷史正義).140  Most submissions seek full 
or partial restoration of aboriginal lands expropriated via Japanese colonialism 
or KMT coercion.  Additionally, many bills request a measure of historical 
justice.  Similar to the issues with truth-seeking, there are many tribes which 
the Taiwanese government does not specifically recognize as “aboriginal” or 
as a distinct tribe, thus their cultural and political representation remains 
                                            
138 For a general overview of Japanese practices of dealing with indigenous Taiwanese, see PAUL D. 
BARCLAY, OUTCASTS OF EMPIRE: JAPAN’S RULE ON TAIWAN’S “SAVAGE BORDER,” 1874–1945 (2018). 
139 Tsai Ing-wen, President, Republic of China, Formal Apology to Indigenous People (Aug. 1, 2016), 
translated in Full Text of President Tsai Ing-wen’s Apology to Indigenous People, FOCUS TAIWAN (Aug. 1, 
2016, 8:54 PM), http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201608010026.aspx. 
140 For an up-to-date listing of the current bills submitted to the Legislative Yuan for consideration, see 
https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lylgmeetc/lgmeetkm?$$APIINTMEET!!XX%28KI%3D法案%20OR%20KI%3D預決
算 %20OR%20KI%3D 施 政 質 詢 %20OR%20KI%3D 國 是 論 壇 %20OR%20KI%3D 臨 時 提
案%20OR%20KI%3D黨團協商%20OR%20KI%3D其他%29%20AND%20%28原住民%29.  
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limited. 141   Many of the bills, therefore, request research and official 
clarification of the complexity of the indigenous tribes of Taiwan.  In partial 
response to this, Tsai recently established the Presidential Indigenous 
Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee (Yuanzhu minzu lishi 
zhengyi yu zhuanxing zhengyi wei yuan hui, 原住民族歷史正義與轉型正
義委員會) tasked with managing many of these issues.142  The DPP must 
ensure that transitional justice is all-encompassing, otherwise its legislation 
runs the risk of being categorized as myopic, much like the previous 
legislation of the KMT. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has demonstrated how the local, post-transition conditions 
of individual locales impact the scope and timeline of transitional justice.  
Taiwan represents a fascinating example.  Its experience of transitional justice 
has been extremely slow to develop and quite conservative.  Furthermore, it 
has been viewed with varying levels of ambivalence by the government and 
populace.  One important factor influencing Taiwan’s transitional justice 
experience has been the political resilience of the KMT, the former 
authoritarian party. 
 
Yet with the transition of political power and control of the legislature 
to the DPP, the modes of engagement and the priorities of “transitional justice” 
are again constrained by various factors.  The pursuit of the KMT assets bill 
could be argued as important for its influence on the democratic functioning 
of Taiwan’s government and electoral system.  Yet, after it passed, the 
political drive for the Transitional Justice Act waned.  It took an extraordinary 
effort to get the Transitional Justice Act through its final reading, and the DPP 
should be commended for that success.  However, questions remain as to how 
well this committee will function; how it will utilize its considerable range of 
powers; and whether the public will view its work as contributing to national 
healing and reconciliation, or alternatively as deepening lingering ethnic and 
social tensions.  The recent activities of the Illicit Assets Committee raise the 
question of whether the DPP transitional justice is actually about confronting 
                                            
141 Ciwang Teyra, Who Are the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples?, KETAGALAN MEDIA (July 7, 2015), 
http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2015/07/07/taiwanese-indigenous-peoples/. 
142 Presidential Office Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee, OFF. 
PRESIDENT REPUBLIC CHINA (TAIWAN), http://indigenous-justice.president.gov.tw/EN (last visited Jan. 25, 
2018). 
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the past and healing old wounds or is simply a case of revenge against a long 
dominating political party.143  The DPP government and legislature are still in 
their early days.  How transitional justice advances during the remaining years 
of Tsai’s presidency remains to be seen.  In order to be successful, however, 
the government will need to ensure that its methods bring about the desired 
reconciliation rather than further bifurcation of society, and it will need to 
ensure that its transitional justice policies are inclusive of all groups, 
especially the indigenous communities that have traditionally been 
marginalized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
143 Chen Wei-han, supra note 115; Yang Chun-hui & Jonathan Chin, KMT Workers Protest Freeze of 
Assets, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/10/14/ 
2003657131. 
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